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100-1-1881

10 AUG 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE  
JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: NIS Program

1. Enclosed is the Annual Report of the NIS Program for the fiscal year 1950.
2. During the course of this past year, the original requirements for NIS production of the equivalent of 15 NIS a year were reduced to the equivalent of 8 NIS a year in view of the insufficient capabilities of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies. Even this reduced goal was not attained during Fiscal Year 1950. Moreover, the quality of the contributions was deficient in many instances. There are also many gaps in the basic intelligence which will require considerable collection effort to fill.
3. Since the end of Fiscal Year 1950, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies have diverted most of their capabilities to meeting the requirements of the current situation. The Office of Naval Intelligence has given formal notice that, because of the current situation in the Far East, work on Navy commitments to the NIS Program will be suspended until further notice. The NIS representatives from Army and Air Force have informally indicated similar decisions regarding work on Army and Air Force commitments. Although the Office of Intelligence Research has not indicated that the current situation will adversely affect work on Department of State commitments, the action of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies will seriously affect progress of the NIS Program.
4. The NIS Program is a long range project undertaken in accordance with NSCIB No. 3 and is designed to produce all basic

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intelligence needed by the Government. Such a program, in order to produce adequate basic intelligence, requires special machinery for control and coordination, extensive analytical research, and intensified collection and collation. Once these activities are interrupted they are difficult to set in motion again. Hence, if the program is to cover the high priority countries in a reasonable time, production must proceed in an orderly and continuous manner.

5. Basic intelligence is so vital to planning that, if planners cannot obtain such intelligence from the NIS, they will obtain it by means of a swollen volume of ad hoc requests. The result is a disruption of the NIS Program, such as we are now experiencing which, if continued, will mean the reversion of basic intelligence to its highly unsatisfactory state existing at the beginning of World War II.

6. Although comprehending fully the exigencies demanded by the requirements of the current situation, it is hoped that the NIS Program will receive a high priority and a high degree of interest from all the Agencies in order that it may not die on the vine.

**Signer**

W. R. HILLMAN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central  
Intelligence

Information copies to:

Executive Secretary, NSC *w/ence*  
AEC *w/o encl*  
FBI *w/o encl*

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AD/ORE  
signer's copy  
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PC/dhl/COAPS-10 Aug. 1950

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ER 1-1702A

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : Acting Executive

SUBJECT: NIS Program

DATE: 2 August 1950

1. The attached memorandum from Chief, COAPS, appears to be negative in approach to a problem which I believe at this time requires more positive action.

2. The primary problem to be solved now appears to be: Is or is not the NIS program considered essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, if it is, what is considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the minimum effort essential to meet the current situation, and thereafter, their estimates by priority *of* ~~and~~ what may be needed to meet future developments.

3. In view of the attitude and lack of action of the IAC agencies in the NIS field, it is not believed that we can expect any real assistance from them either in determining what the problem is or in meeting the problem once it has been determined, without a strong positive direction from the Joint Chiefs which may be used by CIA as a basis for insisting on results.

4. Recommend:

a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be immediately requested to inform CIA

(1) whether or not the NIS program is essential to defense needs,

(2) if it is essential, what portions are needed immediately and what priorities should apply to further NIS production, and

(3) what action has been taken by the Joint Chiefs to require necessary support and production on the part of the individual military intelligence agencies to meet the established JCS requirements.

b. Upon receipt of the above-requested information from the Joint Chiefs, CIA should

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(1) ascertain immediately both the willingness and the capability of the intelligence agencies concerned to meet the requirements prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

(2) present whatever recommendations may be necessary to the National Security Council in order to insure full implementation of whatever program has been determined to be essential.



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Copy to:  
Chief, COAPS

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ER-1-1702

31 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director  
Acting Executive

SUBJECT: NIS Program and Annual Report

1. We agree with just about all of the substance in the AD/ORE's memorandum on the above subject dated 21 July 1950, but think the NIS Report is too detailed and too long. We cannot, however, agree with all of AD/ORE's recommendations because they are too unrealistic under present conditions. In time of war many other items take precedence over basic intelligence.

a. The Joint Staff gave us a reduced list earlier this year after cogitating on the matter for 4 to 6 months. If they decided to base it on capabilities rather than on supposedly real National Security needs, that was their affair. They probably realized they couldn't get funds and personnel for everything. We, however, should report that the participating agencies are not living up to even these lowered requirements and that is what this fiscal year report does.

b. The Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies did determine their capabilities a few months ago to do the 8 instead of 15 per year, but apparently Korea has now changed that. If they prefer current intelligence to basic intelligence, we don't see how we can make them stick to basic production. Even with the new NSCID, I doubt if they would.

d. Here again if the Service Agencies say they are dropping their share of the NIS work, we cannot make them agree to resume it.

2. When we tried to talk over the 1949 fiscal year NIS Report in the IAC, it was never done because something else came up. We might try it again with this 1950 Report and tell them strongly that they are undermining the whole project; or try to make them declare themselves on whether they will discontinue the whole NIS program or whether they will really go along at its reduced pace. A paper agreement apparently is of no use, so probably an oral one would be no more significant.

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
3. We recommend that

(1) The 1950 NIS Report go to the participating IAC agencies with a covering memorandum quoting from the AD/ORE memorandum of 21 July 1950 paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. A closing paragraph could ask what they propose to do about the NIS at this time -- continue it as established (8 per year) or kill it. An information copy should go to the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

(2) Then we can consider an alternative to the present system which might be to have the NIS prepared by State, Commerce, Library of Commerce, Universities, the Geographic Societies, etc. on a contract basis omitting the Pentagon altogether.

4. The military are the chief users and if they won't produce it nowadays, maybe it should be considered a peacetime backlog, rather than a more urgent matter. So maybe the alternative suggestion should be actively supported to make it a civilian research project. As the 1950 Report points out, it has never been a really satisfactory project, as now established; so, with the military situation what it is, it may now be the time to change it to a more or less private research project.

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PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief  
Coordination, Operations  
and Policy Staff

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cc: Assistant Director, ORE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM : The Assistant Director, ORE

SUBJECT : Status of the NIS Program

1. There are submitted herewith "Annual Report of the NIS Program Fiscal Year 1950", and six copies thereof for the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; and the Chiefs of Intelligence of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2. During the course of this past year, the original requirements for NIS production of the equivalent of 15 NIS a year were reduced to the equivalent of 8 NIS a year in view of the insufficient capabilities of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies. Even this reduced goal was not attained during Fiscal Year 1950. Moreover, the quality of the contributions was seriously deficient in far too many instances. There were also many gaps in the basic intelligence which will require considerable collection effort to fill.

3. Since the end of Fiscal Year 1950, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies have diverted most of their capabilities to meeting the requirements of the current situation. The Office of Naval Intelligence has given formal notice that, because of the current situation in the Far East, work on Navy commitments to the NIS Program will be suspended until further notice. The NIS representatives from Army and Air Force have informally indicated similar decisions regarding work on Army and Air Force commitments. Although the Office of Intelligence Research has not indicated that the current situation will adversely affect work on Department of State commitments, the action of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies will seriously affect progress of the NIS Program.

4. This is not the first occasion when an emergency has interfered with Armed Forces commitments to the NIS Program. When preparation was being made to implement the Military Defense Aid Program, demands on the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies, while not causing a complete stoppage of NIS production, were such as to effect drastic curtailment thereof. Hence, judging from this and the current instances, it is valid to conclude that, even if the Armed Forces Agencies eventually resume NIS production, this production will be curtailed or halted again as soon as the next emergency arises.

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5. The NIS Program is a long range project undertaken in accordance with NSCID No. 3 and is designed to produce all basic intelligence needed by the Government. Such a program, in order to produce adequate basic intelligence, requires special machinery for control and coordination, extensive analytical research, and intensified collection and collation. Once these activities are interrupted they are difficult to set in motion again. Hence, if the program is to cover the high priority countries in a reasonable time, production must proceed in an orderly and continuous manner.

6. Basic intelligence is so vital to planning that, if planners cannot obtain such intelligence from the NIS, they will obtain it by means of a swollen volume of ad hoc requests. The result is a disruption of the NIS Program, such as we are now experiencing which, if continued, will mean the reversion of basic intelligence to its highly unsatisfactory state of World War II.

7. The Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies have never, even in ordinary times, fully met their NIS commitments either quantitatively or qualitatively. They have been repeatedly urged to realign their effort so as to remedy this default. This urging has, however, had little salutary effect. In these agencies, the NIS effort is so intermingled with other efforts that extrication of the former has been impossible; and, when the NIS effort has collided with some other effort, the latter has frequently taken precedence.

8. Because the NIS Program is a joint undertaking, unilateral action on the part of a major contributor leading to a diminution of his capabilities has immediate and serious effect upon other contributors, upon commitments of CIA, and upon an integrated production schedule. It also vitiates existing commitments under the NIS Program as approved by the National Security Council. The Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies, however, have repeatedly taken such unilateral action in spite of existing agreements. The continuation of this state of affairs can only mean the emasculation and eventual demise of the NIS Program.

9. Essentially, there are two conditions which must be satisfied before the NIS Program is fully consonant with the provisions of NSCID No. 3:

a. The determination of NIS production requirements which are necessary to meet the minimum fundamental interests of national security.

While the Joint Staff have concurred in the reduction of NIS production from 15 NIS to 8 NIS a

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year, they have not indicated whether this reduction is prejudicial to the national security. In consequence, NIS requirements are being determined by current agency capabilities rather than by fundamental considerations of national security.

b. The augmentation of agency capabilities necessary to satisfy on a continuing, long-range basis the requirements of (a) above.

The augmentation of agency capabilities has been the subject of much correspondence and discussion between CIA and the IAC Agencies. The Intelligence Agency of the Department of State has set up a special staff solely for NIS work [redacted]

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10. The NIS Program provides a comprehensive and logical means for developing the basic intelligence required by the Government. If this program is to be effectively implemented, however, the Intelligence Agencies must consistently support it to the extent required by the national security. This support cannot be intermittently diverted to other activities without serious dislocation, unbalance, and marked impairment of NIS production. Current demands for such NIS and JANIS as are available on the Far East, especially Korea, are indicative of the vital nature of basic intelligence to the national security. Only seven years ago, the JANIS Program was initiated in the midst of a shooting war to produce basic intelligence which should have been available before hostilities had commenced. The NIS Program was set up to correct that situation. Yet, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies appear to have lost sight of this fundamental consideration. It is therefore recommended that:

a. reconsideration be given to obtaining statement from the Joint Staff as to their minimum requirements for basic intelligence contained in the NIS without prejudice to the national security (Enclosure A);

b. determination be made by the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies of the capabilities which they and the Technical

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Services' contributors need to meet the minimum requirements of the Joint Staff;

c. appropriate action be initiated to obtain the requisite funds for the continuing support of these capabilities;

d. pending action on the foregoing, that agreements be reached with the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies to re-assign such capabilities to NIS work as will maintain NIS production in accordance with existing schedules.

[Redacted Signature Box]

/ THEODORE BABBITT

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Enclosure (A)

Attached:

7 copies of "Annual Report  
of the NIS Program Fiscal  
Year 1950"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM TO: DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE,  
THE JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Survey Program.

REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum of Director of Central Intelligence to Rear Admiral John P. Womble, Jr., Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff, 1 December 1949, Subject: National Intelligence Survey Program.  
(b) Memorandum of Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, to Director of Central Intelligence, 20 March 1950, Subject: Priority List and Production Rate for National Intelligence Surveys.

1. The intent of reference (a) was to obtain a statement of minimum requirements of the Joint Staff for basic intelligence contained in the National Intelligence Surveys without prejudice to the national security. However, reference (b) states that the Joint Staff requirements must conform to the reduced agency capabilities, but leaves unsaid whether or not such new requirements will be prejudicial to the national security.

2. The National Security Council authorized and directed the establishment of the NIS Program to provide the basic intelligence requirements of this Government. In my responsibility as coordinator for the NIS Program, I am concerned with the extent of those requirements in order to determine and to ensure the adequacy of related production capabilities.

3. In view of these considerations, I should appreciate an early indication by the Joint Staff whether or not a rate of production of the approximate equivalent of eight (8) NIS per year does in fact represent the minimum Joint Staff requirement without prejudice to the national security and, if not, what the minimum requirement should be.

**S E C R E T****ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NIS PROGRAM****Fiscal Year 1950****MAIN REPORT**

1. This report covers the second year of operations of the NIS Program. It consists of the "MAIN REPORT", covering the significant developments during the year, and three Annexes: "I - PRODUCTION REPORT", "II - EDITORIAL REPORT", and "III - PUBLICATION REPORT". Reference should be made to the "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1949" for the background and significant aspects of the NIS Program which will not be dealt with so extensively in the present report.

2. Considerably more progress was attained in the production of NIS during FY 1950 than that realized during FY 1949. There were 398 NIS sections sent to CIA by contributors during this fiscal year which represent the equivalent of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  NIS. These sections were on 40 individual NIS Areas, with the largest block, 34 sections, relating to the USSR. During this fiscal year there were 287 sections reviewed and cleared for publication by CIA, and 216 sections printed and disseminated. In addition to the contributions transmitted to CIA, the Intelligence Agencies now have 445 NIS sections in various stages of preparation which represent the equivalent of about 8 NIS. The percentage of NIS contributions, by agencies, received by CIA during the year, was as follows: State 27%, Army 43%, Navy 10%, Air Force 9%, CIA 11%. While this year's production effort is commendable, and roughly doubled that attained last year, it still falls short of current production requirements by approximately the equivalent of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  complete NIS.

3. The main defect in NIS contributions received during this year was not a quantitative deficiency, however, but a qualitative deficiency. This resulted in much wasted effort on the part of all processing and reviewing components and continues to be the largest single factor in holding back production. Less than 35% of all contributions reviewed by the NIS Division (CIA) during FY 1950 were

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adequate, with reasonable editing, to meet the present minimum NIS requirements. More than 40% of all contributions required extensive review and coordination with contributors. The remainder, about 25% of all contributions, required major re-working by the contributors before they could meet minimum requirements. This distribution pattern is generally applicable to contributions from each of the four Intelligence Agencies - State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The nature of the defects, however, varied somewhat with the subject matter and with the individual agencies.

4. The principal reasons for the qualitative deficiencies in the NIS contributions are attributable to the following: a) unrealistic production schedules which over-extended agency capabilities to the point where quality was sacrificed to quantity; b) inadequate review and coordination at the working and control levels in the Intelligence Agencies; c) inexperience and incompetence of many working level analysts. The first of these factors, a) above, has been dealt with by reducing the production effort from the equivalent of 15 complete NIS per year to the approximate equivalent of 8 NIS per year. In respect to the second factor, b) above, the NIS Coordinator has emphasized throughout the past year the need for more adequate review and coordination of NIS contributions by the Intelligence Agencies, and steps have already been taken by each agency to improve the situation. It is still too early to determine the adequacy of this corrective action. The third factor, c) above, is not amenable to immediate improvement. In some cases contributors are saddled with personnel who are not competent analysts, but the inertia of civil service procedure makes it difficult to transfer or discharge such individuals. The Intelligence Agencies are fully aware of this matter and no doubt will find ways and means to improve personnel qualifications gradually over the years. The quality of NIS contributions, however, will suffer so long as there are incompetent analysts producing them.

5. The over-all delays between completion of first drafts of NIS contributions and their final publication are still excessive. In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies in quality of contributions, which require a disproportionate amount of time in review, coordination, and re-working, the principal factors contributing to delays in NIS production are: a) delays in coordination and review of subcontributions by the section and chapter coordinators within the Intelligence Agencies; b) submission to CIA of incomplete

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contributions (i.e., text without accompanying maps and graphics) by the Intelligence Agencies; c) bottlenecks in the printing process within the GPO special unit, particularly with regard to collation and binding; and d) small but cumulative delays within the NIS Division itself, which are gradually being reduced as the T/O is brought up to strength and a more balanced production flow is attained. In respect to a) above, the problem is mainly one of balancing production by the various subcontributors to ensure a reasonable fulfillment of working level schedules, and the assigning of adequate full time personnel to the reviewing and coordinating functions within each Intelligence Agency. The situation respecting b) above, is gradually improving and should not be too serious in the future. The bottlenecks in the GPO special unit, c) above, are due mainly to lack of space for efficient production layout and probably cannot be corrected until more space can be made available. The delays in printing, however, are serious and require corrective action before the over-all period between the preparation of contributions and their final printing can be acceptably shortened.

6. The production schedule for Preliminary NIS Gazetteers was fully met for FY 1950. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN) processed 150,950 geographic names, which comprised 22 Preliminary Gazetteers. In addition, BGN edited the geographic names on 20 NIS base maps and 358 NIS sections. The standardization of geographic names has been of inestimable value to the Intelligence Agencies in the production of NIS. The Preliminary Gazetteers have been used solely by the producers of the NIS up to the present; but it is intended to extend their use, as security permits, to other departments of the government, using reserve stock for this purpose. Eventually, it is intended to release all geographic names produced under the NIS Program so that the BGN may make them available to the public under direct appropriations from the Congress for that purpose. For security reasons this release must wait until such a sufficient time interval has elapsed that these geographic names will no longer be associated with the NIS production schedule.

7. The NIS base map schedule has generally been met for this year. The Map Division (CIA) has produced 28 NIS base maps, 22 NIS page-size maps, and 40 NIS section cover maps. In addition, the Map Division completed 112 final NIS base maps and 240 color proofs of NIS maps. Moreover, the Map Division contributed to and served as chapter coordinator of NIS Chapter IX, "Map and Chart Appraisal".

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Eight Chapters IX (45 sections) were completed during the year. While this represents only 70% of the production requirements originally set for FY 1950, it fully meets the revised production requirements. It is noteworthy that none of the Chapter IX contributions of the Map Division required major re-working or revision. Like the Preliminary NIS Gazetteers, the NIS base maps have served their purpose admirably, not only in terms of efficient centralization of mapping services whereby all NIS contributors are supplied with necessary base maps, but also in the general cartographic excellence of the finished maps which are produced by Map Division.

8. The NIS Committee held 40 meetings during FY 1950. The efficacy and fundamental soundness of the NIS Committee type of organization for directing the NIS Program was well proved during the past year's operations. The "two-hat" system used in the NIS Committee, whereby the representatives of the Intelligence Agencies also directed the implementation of the NIS Program within their respective agencies, is growing increasingly effective in strengthening the control and coordination of the program. There was continued in committee actions the principle of unanimity, which has characterized its proceedings from the inception of the NIS Program, and which has done much to cement inter-agency relations and to make the NIS Program a joint effort in fact. The excellence of representation from the Intelligence Agencies, and the gratifying spirit of understanding and cooperation which prevailed within the Committee, greatly assisted the Chairman in the carrying out of his responsibilities. There are also increasing indications that the members of the NIS Committee are being accorded more support by their agencies in implementing the NIS Program within their agencies. This does not necessarily mean that such support is sufficient. The greatest weakness still lies in the coordinating and reviewing functions of chapter and section coordinators within the Agencies. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the failure of these levels results in material being received in CIA which never should have been cleared by the agencies responsible for its initial review and coordination.

*Propaganda  
corp!!*

*OK but  
87ucers  
think the  
resulting  
NIS product  
is not too good.*

9. During the year, the NIS Committee took a number of steps leading to over-all improvement in policies, requirements, and procedures relating to the NIS Program:

a. Revision of "Standard Instructions" - During the fall of 1949 the NIS Committee appointed inter-agency subcommittees

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to review and revise all NIS chapter and supplement outline guides based on the experience gained since the original ones were formulated. All outline guides have been so revised, with the exception of that for Chapter VII (Scientific). The latter has been delayed because of the organization of a Scientific Intelligence Committee of which the Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIA), is chairman, and the concomitant requirement that he serve as the chairman of NIS Chapter VII Committee.

b. Chapter VII Production - Rather than producing "across the board" Surveys on Chapter VII (Scientific), the NIS Committee decided to restrict production to those countries which have actual and significant scientific potential. Moreover, the Committee took the view that the production of Chapters VII should not be geared to the same rate as other NIS chapters, but should reflect the peculiar difficulties of this field of intelligence and the limited capabilities of the contributors. With the active participation of OSI/CIA in the coordinating and contributing aspects of Chapter VII production beginning with FY 1951, it is felt that the contributions to Chapter VII will be strengthened and improved.

c. Revision of NIS Priorities and Production - When it became apparent that the NIS production requirements of 15 NIS per year were beyond the capabilities of the Intelligence Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to review their requirements and priorities. The reply from the JCS, dated 20 March 1950, advised the Director of Central Intelligence that the JCS concurred in reduced production from the equivalent of 15 NIS to the equivalent of 8 NIS a year. Submitted with the JCS reply was a revised list of priorities to guide NIS production. In consequence, the NIS Production Schedule for the last quarter of FY 1950 was revised to meet these new requirements.

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d. Petroleum Intelligence - At the beginning of FY 1950 the NIS Committee recommended to the Director of Central Intelligence that the allocation of production responsibility for petroleum intelligence (Section 62C) be changed from the Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, to the Munitions Board Petroleum Committee, which had recently been constituted by the Secretary of Defense to provide petroleum intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Armed Forces Agencies. The NIS Committee also recommended the addition of NIS Supplement V (Petroleum) to fulfill additional requirements of the Government for petroleum intelligence. These recommendations were approved by the IAC and the production responsibility was accepted by the Executive Secretary, Munitions Board Petroleum Committee, to take effect beginning with FY 1951.

*Self!*

*to duplicate  
Interior!*

*However, before the end of fiscal 1951, by direct orders from the President it was returned to Interior!*

e. Special NIS - Problems arising out of new requirements by Navy respecting intelligence on Marine Climate and Oceanography led to a decision by the NIS Committee to produce this intelligence in five special NIS covering the ocean areas of the world. The allocation of production responsibility was assigned to Navy with assistance by the Air Force on marine climate sections.

10. The NIS Coordinator has been greatly aided in keeping his "finger on the pulse" of the complex production situation inherent in the NIS Program through a system of production reporting which has been developed during the year. It extends from the initial phases of contributions all the way through the processing, review and publication phases. Departing from the previous methods of agency reporting by percentages of completion, which relied upon personal estimates and other variables, there was devised a system of "phase reporting" by agencies. There are five production phases involved, the first three of which indicate 1/3, 2/3, and completion of first drafts of contributions at the working level. The 4th and 5th phases indicate completion of review and coordination steps in the parent agency. After contributions are received in CIA, there is a second set of phase reports to indicate the progress through final printing. In addition, contributions are assigned categories according to their qualitative adequacy as determined by the editorial review within CIA. From these reports the NIS Coordinator as well as the agency

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Substantive  
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representatives can determine the NIS production situation for each agency as well as for the over-all situation.

11. The maintenance aspects of the NIS Program will become of increasing concern as the publication of initial Surveys attains significant proportions. Directly related to the maintenance program is the collection effort needed to fill the gaps and to refine the basic intelligence contained in the original Surveys. These latter provide a precise guide to field collection by indicating in the Subsections, "Comments on Principal Sources", the extent and nature of the source material and of the categories of intelligence needing collection effort. Each Intelligence Agency is responsible for initiating collection of basic intelligence in those categories for which it has primary production allocation under the NIS Program. The contributing agencies have taken steps to implement this responsibility. As this new information flows in from the field, the Intelligence Agencies will have to assign a commensurate amount of their capabilities to maintaining it in their files and, when warranted, in revising sections of the NIS already published. The NIS Coordinator attaches primary importance to the collection and maintenance programs in view of the many gaps in basic intelligence which have been revealed in NIS contributions reviewed to date. It is this phase of the NIS Program, only now emerging, which can produce basic intelligence necessary to fulfill national security requirements.

12. In a broad view of this year's efforts, definite progress in the NIS Program is apparent. Also apparent are major deficiencies which by now should have been overcome. Moreover, these deficiencies are of a fundamental nature, extending as they do down to the intelligence analysts who prepare the NIS contributions. Finally, it does not appear that the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies are adequately supporting the NIS Program even at the present reduced level of production. All too frequently departmental and other requirements take precedence over NIS work with the result that production schedules are unbalanced and a disproportionate amount of time and effort is required before the situation can be rectified. This difficulty exists because the same personnel used for NIS work are also used for departmental activities. While it is realized that economy measures and long-established practices have necessitated this arrangement, the fact remains that the NIS Program must proceed in an orderly and continuous manner if the vital basic intelligence

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requirements of this Government are to be met in a reasonable time. The assignment of a full time staff in OIR/State solely to NIS work is an effective solution to this problem, and has been made possible through financial support by CIA.

13. The following observations are based on the progress of the NIS Program attained at the end of FY 1950. They are intended to be reasonable and to indicate feasible objectives based on justifiable support of the Intelligence Agencies and of the CIA. It is the opinion of the NIS Coordinator: that insufficient support is being accorded to basic intelligence collection, maintenance, and production; that the Intelligence Agencies are still devoting too much time and effort to other intelligence activities considering the serious gaps and inadequacies existing in basic intelligence; and that the present rate of production of NIS is geared too low to satisfy national security requirements. So far the equivalent of some 10 NIS have been produced although not all have yet been published. At the rate of 8 NIS per year, which represents the present capabilities of the Intelligence Agencies, it will take about 7 more years to complete and publish initial Surveys on the JCS high priority areas. In addition, there must be assigned capabilities sufficient to ensure adequate collection and maintenance to revise the original Surveys. The Ad Hoc Committee which developed the fundamental aspects of the NIS Program recommended that NIS on all areas of high priority should be completed and placed on a maintenance basis by 30 June 1952. This date was concurred in by the Joint Staff and the NSC. The present rate of production will attain this objective some 5 years later, or 1957. Perhaps that is the best we can do under the circumstances but, in view of the present world situation, this matter deserves serious consideration at the policy level.

14. In closing the report of the NIS Program for FY 1950, it is appropriate to quote a significant paragraph of last year's report which is still relevant and bears repeating:

"In emphasizing the defects and difficulties of the present situation, the progress already attained should not be overlooked. A concept, a plan, and an organization have been developed which are fundamentally sound and practicable, and which provide a means for the eventual acquisition, production and maintenance of adequate basic intelligence to meet the

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requirements of this government. Valuable training, experience, and understanding have been gained over the past year. A series of excellent base maps and gazetteers are being produced which will eventually result in world-wide coverage in these two fields. Many of the defects noted herein have been due to unfamiliarity with this type of production. Increased efficiency of producing components will inevitably result from more experience and understanding of requirements. Moreover, the improvements made in the field of basic intelligence will be felt throughout the whole intelligence framework. These factors give balance and perspective to other considerations and should result in a more complete understanding of the NIS Program and to the part it can play in the general intelligence plan."

15. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that:

- a. The NIS Program provides a comprehensive and logical means for developing the basic intelligence required by this government.
- b. The over-all organization which has been set up to implement this program is adequate. There is pressing need within the Intelligence Agencies of the Armed Forces, however, to provide full time staffs capable of fulfilling NIS commitments in an orderly and continuous manner.
- c. The functioning of this organization is still imperfect, mainly in coordination and review functions within the Agencies, but definite improvement has been noted during the past year.
- d. The NIS production during FY 1950 has been deficient in quantity and seriously deficient in quality.
- e. The disparity between production requirements and agency capabilities has been adjusted by reducing production requirements from 15 NIS to 8 NIS per year.

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f. The serious deficiencies in quality of NIS contributions are due mainly to inexperience and incompetence of working level analysts, and to ineffectual coordination and review by chapter and section coordinators.

g. The allocation of production responsibilities is generally sound. Some changes in allocation have been made during the year, and others may be necessary as the program develops.

h. The Outline Guide has been found inadequate and has been completely revised during the current year, except for Chapter VII which is to be revised shortly. Principal additions to the Outline Guide include Supplement V (Petroleum) and 5 Special NIS on "Marine Climate and Oceanography".

i. Increasing effort will be needed in field collection to fill the many gaps existing in basic intelligence so far produced. In turn, this will necessitate augmentation of agency capabilities for the proper maintenance of published NIS.

j. Lack of space for the special GPO unit is causing delays in printing which will become increasingly serious as full production of NIS is attained.

k. The base map and gazetteer programs have been fully satisfactory during the year.



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**ANNEX I - PRODUCTION REPORT**

1. This report considers the NIS Production Program for FY 1950 in four stages:

- a. Material in process in the Intelligence Agencies.
- b. Production requirements and submission of Agency approved draft material.
- c. CIA processing of Agency approved draft material.
- d. Publication of NIS material.

2. NIS Material in Process in the Intelligence Agencies

a. The NIS material in process in the Intelligence Agencies is in varying stages of preparation, coordination, and review. Monthly reports submitted by the producing agencies show the state of preparation of all NIS material in process. The attached graph (A), based upon the progress reports, shows the total number of sections in process at the end of each month, and the number of sections in each of the following five processing phases:

Phase 1 - Drafts approximately 1/3 complete.

Phase 2 - Drafts approximately 2/3 complete.

Phase 3 - Drafts complete and being reviewed by producing component.

Phase 4 - In process of review and coordination by Chapter Coordinator.

Phase 5 - Contributions being prepared for submission to CIA.

The average number of sections in process for all agencies in FY 1950 was approximately 471 sections, which is the approximate number of sections required for the production of the equivalent of 8 NIS, or one year's production requirement.

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b. An analysis of the progress reports, however, disclosed that no progress was made on many of the sections after they had been reported in a 1/3, or better, stage of completion. Following is a tabulation showing, by Agency, the number of sections reported in the same processing phase for six or more months:

	6 Months	7 Months	8 Months	9 Months	10 Months	11 Months	Totals
State	13	24	38	14	39	21	149
Army	6	9	12	7	7	6	47
Navy	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Air Force	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
CIA - Map Branch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIA - OSO	2	4	7	0	1	0	14
	23	37	57	21	47	27	212

c. The apparent complete stoppage of work on the considerable number of sections noted above can be attributed generally to the following:

(1) The opening of many new sections in the first half of FY 1950 under the approved schedule for this period, and the subsequent discontinuance of work on many sections when it was tentatively agreed (NIS Committee Meeting No. 48) that the FY 1950 schedule would have to be revised downward from 15 to 8 NIS per year, unless the capabilities of the Intelligence agencies could be considerably augmented.

(2) The diversion of production effort from regularly scheduled material to partial and in some cases complete revisions of submissions which had been found deficient in D/NIS. With specific regard to State, many of the sections reported in the same phase for long periods were held up in the substantive review and final processing of

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- finished first drafts (Phase 3). Improvement of this situation was noted in recent months.

**3. Production Requirements and Submissions of Agency Approved Draft Material**

a. The production schedule for FY 1950 was formulated by the NIS Committee in May 1949 and the approved tentative schedule was issued on 7 June 1949, approximately one month before the start of FY 1950. This schedule was determined by Joint Staff requirements in accordance with agency capabilities believed to exist at that time. It provided for the production of the approximate equivalent of 15 NIS in FY 1950, which was consonant with the original long range production plan providing for the production of all NIS in areas of high priority by June 1952. However, it soon became evident that some of the agencies had overestimated their capabilities and, further, that the capabilities of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies would be reduced to an even greater extent by economy cuts.

b. A survey of agency capabilities resulted in a decision by the NIS Committee (Meeting No. 48, 15 Nov 49) which tentatively provided for future NIS schedules to accomplish approximately the equivalent of 8 NIS per year, and it was agreed that the FY 1950 schedule would be revised to conform with the new production objective. Revision of the 1950 schedule could not be done, however, until the Joint Staff had indicated whether or not there were any changes in requirements or in the JCS Priority List. Joint Staff views were requested in a memorandum dated 1 December 1949. In a reply dated 20 March 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence was advised that the Joint Staff concurred in the curtailment of the NIS Program from a production of 15 to 8 NIS per year. Submitted with the Joint Staff reply was a revised list of priorities to guide NIS production. On 18 April 1950 a revised production schedule was issued covering requirements for the last quarter of FY 1950.



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c. While NIS Committee action on 15 November 1949 indicated informal approval of production on an 8 NIS per year basis for FY 1950, the original 1950 schedule providing for 15 NIS per year remained as the official production schedule until 18 April 1950. As a consequence the Intelligence Agencies were charged with a total of 344 defections as of 1 April 1950. In order to show accomplishments against scheduled requirements, however, only the official schedules in force during the year have been considered in the following tabulation which shows the relative performance of the Intelligence Agencies.

	Total Sections Due CIA	Total Sections Delivered to CIA	Total Defections FY 1950 (Sections)	Average Monthly Requirements (Sections)	Average Monthly Production (Sections)	Accomplishments (% of Require- ments Actually Produced)
State	293	107	186	24 5/12	8 3/4	36.5%
Army	329	170	159	27 5/12	14 1/6	51.6%
Navy	60	40	20	5	3 1/3	66.6%
Air Force	46	38	8	3 5/6	3 1/6	82.6%
CIA - Map Br.	54	42	12	4 1/2	3 1/2	77.7%
CIA - OSO	13	1	12	1 1/12	0 1/12	7.7%
CIA - OSI	1	0	1	1/12	0	0%
	796	398	398	66 1/3	33 1/6	50%

d. Since no schedule based on a production of 8 NIS per year was issued for the entire FY 1950, no records are available for a comparative performance tabulation on that basis. However, the attached graph (B) shows the number of sections submitted each month by each agency; the average monthly requirements for all agencies for production of the approximate equivalent of

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8 NIS per year; and the actual average production per month of all agencies. It will be noted, that against an average monthly requirement of 40 sections per month, the agencies actually produced an average of 33 sections per month, which is the approximate equivalent of 6 1/2 NIS per year. Therefore, quantitative production by the Agencies during FY 1950 fell approximately 1 1/2 NIS short of the revised objective.

**4. CIA Processing of Agency Approved Draft Material**

a. The average time of processing NIS material from date of receipt in CIA to date of publication was 7 months and 13 days for the 216 sections that were published in FY 1950.

b. Delays in processing NIS material in CIA can be attributed in the first instance to qualitative inadequacies of the agency approved material, text and graphics, submitted to CIA.

c. A second major time lag has occurred in the GPO-State Services Office. Usually, two to three months have elapsed between the date page proofs were approved for final printing and the date of actual publication.

d. Delay in D/NIS processing also resulted from failure of agencies to submit all required copies of text or graphics. The irregularity occurring most frequently was the submission of an NIS section with the notice that the originals of certain figures had been sent to Map Division or Army Map Service and that color proofs would be delivered directly to D/NIS from one or the other of these agencies in a specified number of days, and it was seldom that the missing material was received in D/NIS in the time specified. All agencies had been notified that only complete NIS units would be accepted in D/NIS.

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**5. Publications of NIS Material Approved for Printing by D/NIS**

a. The attached graph (C) shows the month by month publication of NIS, and the monthly backlog of material in the GPO-State Services Office which had been approved for final printing.

b. The average monthly publication of NIS during FY 1950 was approximately 18 sections. The average monthly backlog of NIS material approved for final printing, which was in GPO-State Services Office, was 52 sections. At the average production rate maintained in FY 1950 (18 sections) it would take about 3 months to eliminate the backlog. If the sections are printed in the order in which final approval for printing is given to GPO it is obvious that there will be a continuation of the 2 to 3 months time lag before publication.

c. Annexes II and III, which follow, deal with the D/NIS processing in further detail.

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ANNEX II - EDITORIAL REPORT

1. During FY 1950 the Editorial Branch, NIS Division, received from contributors 398 NIS sections, and cleared to Publication Branch 311 sections. This compared with approximately 130 sections received and 70 sections cleared to Publication Branch in the seven months between receipt of initial NIS contributions and the end of FY 1949.
2. The 311 sections actually processed by the Editorial Branch during FY 1950 were on 36 individual NIS Areas: 40 sections on the USSR were the largest block; next in order were 27 sections on Sweden, 19 on Denmark, and 17 each on Libya and Turkey. The largest total by topic was 17 section 37's (Civil Air); next in order were 13 section 38's (Telecommunications) and 11 section 25's (Towns); there were 9 each section 83's (Air Forces) and section 36's (Merchant Marine). Individual sections ranged in size from less than 10 manuscript pages for several to over 1500 manuscript pages for the section on Coasts and Landing Beaches for one of the four USSR regions. Of the 311 sections sent to Publication Branch, Army contributed 38%, State 27%, Air Force 13%, CIA Map Division 11%, Navy 11%.
3. Incoming and outgoing flow of material during FY 1950, monthly, is shown by graph (D). Sections cleared to the Publication Branch included some material received during the preceding fiscal year, and did not include roughly 50 sections received during FY 1950 but at the end of the year not returned from contributor revision, in various stages of editorial processing, or awaiting processing. Including 29 sections awaiting contributor re-working (after editorial work at least equivalent to average completed processing), the Editorial Branch completed an average of approximately 23 sections per month. This was an average of slightly more than one section per working day, and approximately 3 sections per month per editor on duty. Editorial completions in March were abnormally high because of moving a number of sections previously largely edited but held for various reasons. Completions for the last six months of FY 1950 gave a practical indication of editorial capability under present conditions of around 35 sections per month. The comparison of the 1950 incoming and outgoing flow with a 40-per-month line (graph D) indicates the considerable improvement which will be required to meet the projected FY 1951 schedule of approximately 40 sections per month.

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4. The basic FY 1950 pattern of NIS contributions is indicated by the following recapitulation of sections processed by the Editorial Branch:

<u>Category of Material</u>	<u>Sections Processed</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
I Requiring only reasonable editing and liaison with contributors	105	31%
II Requiring extended Editorial checking plus extensive coordination with contributors and major cumulative delay (Including 10 sections awaiting contributor re-working following initial editing)	149	44%
III Returned to contributors as requiring major re-working, or requiring an equivalent extent of joint correction and re-working (Including 19 sections awaiting contributor re-working following initial editing)	86	25%
	<u>340</u>	<u>100%</u>

5. The distribution of the same categories, in terms of the four agencies of primary responsibility and CIA Map Division, was:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Sections Processed</u>	<u>C a t e g o r y</u>		
		<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>
Army	135	40	55	40
State	92	25	39	28
CIA	36	24	12	0
Air Force	38	8	21	9
Navy	<u>39</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>9</u>
	340	105	149	86

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6. Of the 311 sections cleared to the Publication Branch, less than 35% were adequate, with reasonable editing, to meet first-phase minimum NIS requirements. The relative term "reasonable" does not imply that sections in Category I generally met longer-term NIS qualitative standards in presentation and particularly substance. The results of Categories II and III processing were similarly relative in view of the practical limitations on the improvement possible without seriously delaying NIS production.

7. The above qualitative evaluation and processing aspects were generally comparable to FY 1949 experience, although qualitative evaluation was somewhat more lenient on the initial contributions processed during FY 1949. There was improvement in some types of material during FY 1950, not only in reduced errors but in substance and presentation. This was counter-balanced, however, by at best nominal improvement in other types of material, particularly for Chapter III (Transportation and Telecommunications), and by qualitative deficiencies in types of material received in quantity for the first time in FY 1950, notably for Chapters IV (Sociological), V (Political), and VI (Economic). Qualitative category distribution of sections approved for publication, indicates some improvement in category relationships over the course of FY 1950.

8. As in 1949, deficiencies in material were only nominally chargeable to contributor unfamiliarity with NIS format and general content concepts. No sections were returned to contributors on the basis of writing style or failure to conform in detail to the NIS outline. No sections were classified in Categories II or III on the basis of mutual rearrangement of material, or when contributors took the initiative for revision.

9. Continuing experience from receipt of the initial NIS contributions, the 1950 deficiency which was principal, pervasive, and unacceptably time-consuming for both the Editorial Branch and contributors, was elementary and essentially careless errors in text, tabular data, and graphic material. Many of these were significant. Others were of a type which, while not necessarily of individual significant magnitude, were cumulatively capable of jeopardizing general credibility of NIS material. Editorial detection of such deficiencies in line-by-line examination, which proved to be the only adequate procedure for the bulk of contributions,

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and the Editorial Branch and contributor time consumed in correction -- with such time rising in geometrical proportion to cumulative time-lag after material left the original authors -- not only seriously delayed over-all movement of NIS material to Publication Branch but precluded more fundamental improvement in the substance and adequacy of the NIS.

10. Another continued deficiency was excessive contributor reliance on relatively old material, much of which had previously been published. Frequently no reference was made to more recently available issues of official yearbooks or similar material used as principal sources. There was an evident related tendency to accord priority to material because it was "intelligence", even if fragmentary and uncoordinated, without making reasonable and constructive use of commercial sources such as well-established trade journals. Appropriate use of the latter often would have given a more professional level of treatment to NIS contributions than ones which have been prepared by non-technical authors. There was limited evidence of information from World War II experience, Service reports, photography, and historical material. With a few and encouraging exceptions, this was particularly noticeable with respect to photography. There was a pervasive contributor tendency to use existing tabular and graphic material without appropriate adaptation for the NIS. There was a general predilection to use large and elaborate maps which detracted from graphic value. Chapters IV (Sociological) and V (Political) material presented editorial difficulties in obtaining less emotional phraseology and more objectivity and perspective in presentation. In certain Chapter III (Transportation and Telecommunications) sections, Editorial Branch has had to guard consistently against a tendency toward too brief and generalized treatment even when considerable data were available to the contributor.

11. While the Editorial Branch is not sufficiently informed to determine the factors responsible for deficiencies in contributions, such factors have been indicated in processing of the material and working-level conferences with author and coordinating personnel. Working-level personnel have almost unanimously cited as a prime factor unrealistic assigned production schedules and insistence on their being met. On the basis of the effective manpower and the inherent difficulty in preparing basic intelligence material, the initial production schedules were highly unrealistic and in any

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event must have largely precluded even nominal additional research to incorporate more recent and more comprehensive data. Even so, Editorial Branch saw many instances where, in terms of total time involved in a contribution, a negligible additional amount of time would have considerably improved photographic material. There were other instances where preliminary reference to trade-journals or comparable types of available well-organized presentations would actually have saved time and produced better NIS material. There was indication that, on the one hand, certain material requiring relatively mature author experience and capability had been prepared by around GS-7 level personnel, without effective subsequent review. Certain other material appeared, on the other hand, to have been prepared by more mature authors, but not subjected to lower-echelon detailed examination which Editorial Branch was forced to perform. When Editorial Branch found many significant errors in one section, the originating office stated that relatively inexperienced personnel had prepared the material. The section, however, had been forwarded without appropriate additional review provisions, and without informing the Editorial Branch of the situation. Generally speaking, by more or less recognized default Editorial Branch was delegated detailed checking and substantive responsibilities of NIS author and coordinator echelons.

12. Contributor as well as editorial problems were increased by the above circumstances. In many cases the process of correcting errors and deficiencies some time after author completion, involving identification of and efforts to re-obtain original source material, undoubtedly required more contributor man-hours than the time necessary for adequate original preparation. These multiple problems affected all contributors to varying extents, but converged on the Editorial Branch. Experience demonstrated that, even with the Category I contributions, it was necessary for the Editorial Branch to make line-by-line and item-by-item check of submitted material. In most cases, significant factual inconsistencies and errors were not obvious from the mass of material concerned, and required at least summary cross-check with other NIS or other material. Experience further showed that nearly comparable checking was required on re-submitted Categories II and III material. An estimated 400 editorial hours were required to demonstrate the deficiencies which led the agency concerned to recommend complete revision of one major section after the section presumably had been once revised. A number of re-submissions were returned to contributors a second time. It was consistent editorial policy to avoid the extensive re-writing of



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material which would have been the more expeditious means of raising the qualitative level of material. The alternative procedure of providing detailed guidance but not diminishing the responsibility of the contributors for actually preparing acceptable material was more time-consuming and demanding of Editorial Branch manpower but was in the long-range interest of fundamental improvement in basic intelligence. Within the limitations on time imposed by the necessity for getting material into published form, editorial personnel not only conferred with contributors on individual sections but participated in a series of more generalized conferences with author and coordinator personnel which proved effective in resolving detailed problems and concurrently in developing practical working-level understanding of NIS concepts.

13. Contributor-coordinator-Editorial Branch relationship has been generally good and, in view of the extent and nature of the problems cited above, remarkably so. Although there have been instances of initial contributor misunderstanding of necessarily brief and non-exhaustive editorial comments on submitted material, there has been general acceptance of this procedure. Various contributors have recently shown initiative in developing improvements, notably in obtaining excellent photography for certain NIS sections.

14. Incorporating BGN recommendations has continued to present major and shifting problems. BGN working-level personnel have shown willing cooperation in developing practical solutions, however, and the problems should not get out of hand.

15. GPO aspects, as channeled through Publication Branch, have shown gradual improvement. General pressure on Editorial Branch has resulted in GPO receiving copy deficient in consistency and not as clean as it should be. On the other hand, GPO proof-reading has varied considerably in adequacy, and NIS appearance has suffered from GPO lack of adaptability in make-up. In response to consistent pressure, it now appears that GPO has adopted procedures which should produce better multi-photograph insert pages.

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## ANNEX III - PUBLICATION REPORT

## 1. Printing

## a. Production

During FY 1950, Publication Branch, D/NIS, processed and forwarded to the printer 287 sections of which 216 sections were published. This compared with 42 sections processed and forwarded to the printer between receipt of initial NIS contributions and the end of FY 1949. The flow of material is shown on the following table:

Month	Sections sent to printer	Sections published
July 1949	20	3
August	15	6
September	25	15
October	11	11
November	6	17
December	21	9
January 1950	36	13
February	9	21
March	41*	20
April	49*	20
May	36	40*
June	18	41*
Total	287	216
Monthly Average	24	18

\*These figures reflect the movement of a large number of short sections released by Editorial Branch during March.

## b. Defects

The backlog at the State Service Office/GPO of sections cleared and awaiting printing increased through April when it totaled 87 sections. Reduction of this backlog was effected during May and June with a total of 49 remaining in the backlog at the

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close of the fiscal year. This production lag occurs mainly in the collating and binding processes where lack of space and adequate equipment retard the production rate.

## c. Quality

Inadequacies in half-tone reproduction, page make-up, table make-up and figure placement, which were evident at the start of the NIS program, have been largely overcome by educational conferences and close cooperation between Publication Branch, State Service Office/GPO and CIA Services Division. Editorial corrections and changes on page proofs have diminished but still exist as an obstacle to smooth production flow.

## 2. Preliminary NIS Gazetteers

## a. Production

Twenty-two Preliminary NIS Gazetteer manuscripts were received and 20 Preliminary NIS Gazetteers were published during FY 1950. The production rate averaged 12,250 names processed per month. This exceeded the anticipated production rate by 2,250 names per month. Contributor defections made it possible to proceed on the gazetteer program with a minimum of conflict with manuscript editing. This would not have been possible if the original NIS Production Schedule for FY 1950 had been maintained for the gazetteer schedule was secondary to the demands of manuscript editing. This advance in the gazetteer schedule places the Board on Geographic Names in a better position for name processing during FY 1951.

## Production of Preliminary NIS Gazetteers

<u>Area</u>	<u>No. of Names</u>	<u>Date Manuscript Received</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
26 USSR Part III	20,000	FY 1949	September
10 Norway and Svalbard	17,500	FY 1949	July
33 Iran	13,300	August	October
17 Italy	7,150	August	October

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Production of Preliminary NIS Gazetteers (Cont.)

<u>Area</u>	<u>No. of Names</u>	<u>Date Manuscript Received</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
32 Arabian Peninsula	6,250	August	September
54 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	5,200	September	November
49 Libya	2,100	September	October
68 Iceland	1,500	October	November
7 Denmark, Faeroe Islands	4,150	October	November
27 Turkey	5,800	October	January
86 Venezuela	6,700	November	January
8 Portugal, Azores, Cape Verde Islands, Madeira Islands	3,320	November	January
65 Alaska	9,850	December	February
4 Netherlands	5,550	January	March
53 Egypt	4,500	January	February
67 Greenland	3,700	February	March
94 Brazil	11,350	February	May
21 Yugoslavia	8,050	March	June
12 Finland	6,920	March	June
15 Switzerland	3,140	March	May
41 Korea	11,580	April	
11 Sweden	4,940	May	
23 Bulgaria	6,800	May	
55 Ethiopia, Eritrea, French Somaliland, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland	19,100	June	

b. Areal coverage

The attached map shows Areal coverage by Preliminary NIS Gazetteers for FY 1949 and FY 1950.

c. Quality

The coverage by the name listings has met the major requirements of contributors and the volumes have shown continuing improvement in the quality of reproduction.

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## 3. Standard NIS Base Maps

## a. Production

Twenty-eight of the 32 NIS Standard Base Maps and 22 of the 28 NIS Page Size Base Maps scheduled for FY 1950 were published. Although these were not published on the dates scheduled, contributor requirements in general were met. This was due to contributor defections in the maintenance of the NIS Production Schedule for FY 1950. The production rate was approximately 2.3 base maps per month. Requirements for name editing on NIS Base Maps were met and name editing on 20 NIS Base Maps was completed at a production rate of 1.6 base maps per month.

## Production of Standard NIS Base Maps

NIS #	Title	Distribution Date	
		Standard Size	Page Size
545	Okinawa	28 July 1949	Not Sched.
4-6	Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg	27 Sept. 1949	Not Sched.
13	Germany	27 Sept. 1949	FY 1949
30	Iraq	29 Sept. 1949	16 Aug. 1949
41	Korea	29 Sept. 1949	FY 1949
49	Libya	17 Oct. 1949	16 Aug. 1949
86	Venezuela	17 Oct. 1949	11 July 1949
3	Portugal	24 Oct. 1949	16 Aug. 1949
4	Netherlands	18 Nov. 1949	12 Dec. 1949
39	China	18 Nov. 1949	FY 1949
21	Yugoslavia	25 Nov. 1949	16 Sept. 1949
55	Ethiopia	28 Dec. 1949	20 Oct. 1949
15	Switzerland	5 Jan. 1950	27 Feb. 1950
7	Denmark	16 Jan. 1950	20 Oct. 1949
65	Alaska	16 Jan. 1950	16 Jan. 1950
68	Iceland	16 Jan. 1950	12 Dec. 1949
94	Brazil	16 Jan. 1950	16 Aug. 1949
40	Mongolian Peoples Republic	24 Jan. 1950	24 Jan. 1950
12	Finland	15 Feb. 1950	12 Dec. 1949
67	Greenland	15 Feb. 1950	18 Nov. 1949
39-III	North China	12 May 1950	Not Sched.
24	Greece	6 June 1950	24 Jan. 1950
17	Italy	29 June 1950	16 Jan. 1950

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## Production of Standard NIS Base Maps (Cont.)

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<u>NIS #</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Standard Size</u>	<u>Page Size</u>
14	Poland	In distribution	In distribution
20	Albania	In distribution	In distribution
23	Bulgaria	In distribution	27 Jan. 1950
18	Czechoslovakia	Incomplete	In distribution

## b. Areal Coverage

The attached map shows Areal coverage by NIS Base Maps for FY 1949 and FY 1950.

## c. Quality

The techniques (separation plates on plastic, non-photographic inks, etc.) developed to adapt the NIS Standard Base Maps to the wide variety of requirements of NIS contributors have been most successful and the selection of basic geographic data have generally been adequate for the majority of users.

## d. Additional requirements

The preparation of a terrain plate (shaded relief) to complete the Standard NIS Base Map requirements was not initiated because of pressure of time and lack of qualified personnel. This basic topographic information is essential to give complete graphic presentation of such data as transportation, military regions, meteorological stations, availability and sources of materials. The addition of this terrain plate will, therefore, greatly enhance the value of the final NIS maps which are constructed on the NIS standard base maps.

## 4. Graphic Material

## a. Submission

Frequently, submissions of graphics by contributors have been incomplete and have caused a delay of from one to three weeks per section in the processing by the Publication Branch, D/NIS.

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This was due in large part to the production lag in color proofing and in duressal printing.

**b. Production and Quality**

Of the graphic material submitted during FY 1950, that included in 108 sections required extensive corrections or complete redrafting; 45 sections required special treatment and substantive corrections, and 96 sections were suitable for normal processing. The primary cause for the poor quality or inadequacy of material is believed to be due to the lack of professional cartographic personnel in contributing agencies. Another factor is the lack of thoroughness in checking and review procedures in originating offices.

Qualitative adequacy of graphic material processed by Publication Branch, D/NIS during FY 1950 is shown (by sections) in the following table:

	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
State	61	4	4
Army	27	5	57
Navy	3	0	17
CIA	0	36	0
Air Force	5	0	30
Total	96	45	108

Category 1 - Normal processing including minor corrections.

Category 2 - Special problems, including substantive corrections.

Category 3 - Major corrections, including redrafting.

**c. Adequacy of Coverage**

Graphic coverage varied throughout the NIS with continuing deficiencies noted in many sections. Major deficiencies noted:

(1) The inadequacy of photographic coverage, both in quality and in subject matter, is marked.

(2) Beach maps submitted to date for Section 22, "Coasts and Landing Beaches", have not been up to NIS

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standards and requirements because of the fact that available published maps (usually aeronautical charts at a scale of 1:500,000) are utilized as the bases upon which pertinent coastal information is drafted. To obtain beach maps to present NIS material adequately, it is essential that specially prepared base maps be drafted. These bases should be at an approximate scale of 1:500,000, designed for reduction to NIS page height, and to portray the following basic information:

- (a) Coverage of approximately 200 miles of coastline, extending 50 miles inland.
- (b) Detailed and accurate coastline with all coastal urban areas; ports being classified according to the categories of principal, secondary, and minor.
- (c) Selected inland cities and transportation routes
- (d) Contour lines

Utilizing these specially prepared bases, pertinent beach and landing information may be constructed in the form of overlays and thus make bases available for other uses and for swift and economic revisions as anticipated under the maintenance program.

5. Name editing

a. Production

The Board on Geographic Names edited geographic names on a total of 358 sections during FY 1950.

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. of Sections by Supplements</u>	<u>No. of Pages (including tables)</u>	<u>No. of Figures (maps and photos.)</u>
July	37	2,071	349
Aug.	25	3,952	753
Sept.	42	2,523	512
Oct.	27	2,186	326



**S E C R E T**

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. of Sections or Supplements</u>	<u>No. of Pages (including tables)</u>	<u>No. of Figures (maps and photos.)</u>
Nov.	38	2,055	246
Dec.	8	1,027	229
Jan.	34	2,024	243
Feb.	16	758	110
Mar.	30	2,422	411
Apr.	23	1,467	238
May	26	2,972	723
June	52	4,246	780
<b>Total:</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>27,703</b>	<b>4,920</b>
<b>Average per month:</b> 29.8		<b>2,308</b>	<b>410</b>


**b. Continuing requirements**

Close scheduling checked by weekly conferences between D/NIS and BGN remain necessary to ensure coordination of the flow of textual material with that of the Editorial Branch and to permit use of name cards for the preliminary NIS Gazetteers, for preliminary name lists from contributors, and for NIS base map requirements. Problems of interpretation and practical application are discussed and cleared at these weekly meetings.

SECRET

NIS MATERIAL IN PROCESS IN THE AGENCIES

Graph A




SECRET

SECRET

AGENCY SUBMISSIONS OF NIS SECTIONS TO CIA

Graph B




SECRET

SECRET

MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF NIS, AND BACKLOG OF  
FULLY PROCESSED MATERIAL APPROVED  
FOR FINAL PRINTING

Graph C




SECRET

SECRET

# EDITORIAL BRANCH PROCESSING OF NIS MATERIAL

Graph D



SECRET

25X1

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